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Connents
Civil Procedure-Opinion Interrogatories After the 1970
Amendment to Federal Rule 33(b)
In 1970 rule 33(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
amended by, among other things, the addition of the following lan-
guage: "An interrogatory otherwise proper is not necessarily objection-
able merely because an answer to the interrogatory involves an opinion
or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact. .. "
The purpose of this comment is to examine briefly the reasons for the
1970 amendment and to survey the cases decided under the amended
rule in an attempt to synthesize a test for determining the permissibility
of an interrogatory calling for an opinion or contention of fact or law
applied to fact.
I. REASONS FOR THE AMENDMENT
Prior to the 1970 amendment of rule 33(b), the scope of dis-
covery by interrogatory was stated as "any matters which can be in-
quired into under rule 26(b)."' Equity rule 582, on which rule 33 was
based,3 limited discovery by interrogatory to facts and documents. In-
itially courts tended to read the same limitation into rule 334 by refusing
to permit interrogatories calling for opinions, contentions or conclusions.
In Pankola v. Texaco, Inc.5 the following interrogatory was before
the court: "Set forth all information . . . in possession of you, your
attorneys, investigators, underwriters, or other representatives, relating
to the accident to plaintiff. ... 6 Notwithstanding that the only ap-
parent opinions or conclusions requested by the question was whether
1. FED. R. Crv. P. 33 (1946). The provision is retained in the revised rule. The
scope of discovery as defined by rule 26(b) is "any matter, not privileged, which is rele-
vant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim
or defense of the examining party or to the claim or defense of any other party ....
It is not ground for objection that the testimony sought will be inadmissible at the trial
if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissi-
ble evidence. . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
2. 28 U.S.C.A., Equity Rule 58 (1927).
3. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2167, at 497
(1970) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
4. Id.
5. 25 F.R.D. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
6. Id. at 186.
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a particular fact related to the plaintiff's accident, the court sustained
the objection to the interrogatory on the ground that it called for an
opinion or conclusion. Decisions such as this were common.7
Hence interrogatories were rejected that call upon a party to clas-
sify his injuries as temporary or permanent and to approximate the
date of partial or complete recovery, or to state what he did in an
attempt to avoid an accident, or to state the speed at which he was
travelling or what he was intending to do at the time of a collision,
or to state which of certain companies the defendant in an antitrust
suit regards as competitors and why any of them are not so re-
garded, or to state whether an estate was solvent, or to say what
in the party's opinion was the nature and cause of an alleged unsafe
or defective condition of a motor.8
In addition to disallowing interrogatories calling for opinion or con-
clusions, many courts would not allow interrogatories seeking the other
party's contentions with regard to matters in issue. In United States
v. Galaxo Group Ltd.' the court held that defendant would not b6 re-
quired to answer interrogatories submitted by the United States con-
cerning certain affirmative defenses put forth by defendant.10 This
type of decision was also common. In several cases courts declined
to make plaintiffs answer interrogatories asking what act or acts the de-
fendant did or failed to do which caused plaintiff's injury." In other
cases defendant was not forced to answer interrogatories asking what
acts or omissions of plaintiff defendant contended contributed to plain-
tiffs injuries.12
The only tenable basis offered to support this narrow scope for
interrogatories was that "the discovery process is intended to lead to
the ascertainment of facts and nothing else."' 3 Apparently some courts
thought that any opinions, conclusions, or contentions expressed by a
7. See, e.g., Schotthofer v. Hagstrom Constr. Co., 23 F.R.D. 666 (S.D. Ill. 1958);
Kluchenac v. Oswald & Hess Co., 20 F.R.D 87 (W.D. Pa. 1957); Helverson v. J.J.
Newberry Co., 16 F.R.D. 330 (W.D. Mo. 1954); United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Bennett, 14 F.R.D. 166 (E.D. Tenn. 1953); Needles v. F.W. Woolworth
Co., 13 F.R.D. 460 (E.D. Pa. 1952); Porter v. Montaldo's, 71 F. Supp. 372 (S.D. Ohio
1946); Caggiano v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 27 F. Supp. 240 (D. Mass. 1939).
8. 4A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 33.17, at 33-75 to -76 (2d ed. 1974)
(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as MooRE].
9. 302 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1969).
10. Id. at 18.
11. E.g., Doucette v. Howe, 1 F.R.D. 18 (D. Mass. 1939); Bailey v. General Sea
Foods, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 391 (D. Mass. 1939).
12. E.g., Ryan v. LeHigh Valley R.R., 5 F.R.D. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Tudor v.
Leslie, 1 F.R.D. 448 (D. Mass. 1940).
13. 4A MooRE % 33.17, at 33-79.
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party in answers to interrogatories would be binding on him at trial.14
Thus, subsequently discovered information could not be used by him.
Under such a rule it would be highly advantageous to pin down a party's
position on crucial points early in the course of the litigation, thus pre-
venting him from deriving any benefit from discovery.
Significantly, however, it has never been held that a party was
limited in his proof at trial by good faith answers he made to interroga-
tories, although such answers, subject to the rules of evidence, are ad-
missible at trial against the answering party.15 In fact, in Freed v. Erie
Lackawanna Railway16 the court allowed defendant to prove facts at
trial diametrically opposed to those he had stated in answers to plain-
tiffs interrogatories. The court held that the answer to the interrog-
atory was not a binding admission and stated that such an answer
is comparable to answers, which may be mistaken, given in deposi-
tion testimony or during the course of the trial itself. Answers to
interrogatories must often be supplied before investigation is com-
pleted and can rest only upon knowledge which is available at the
time. When there is conflict between answers supplied in response
to interrogatories and answers obtained through other questioning,
either in deposition or trial, the finder of fact must weigh all of
the answers and resolve the conflict.' 7
The only case that can be found that even remotely suggests that
a party might, in some circumstances, have his proof at trial limited by
answers given to interrogatories is Zielinski v. Philadelphia Piers, Inc."8
However, a close reading of the case reveals that, rather than binding
a party to answers he gave to interrogatories, the court merely applied
the doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent the defendant from utiliz-
ing intentionally misleading pleadings and answers to interrogatories to
deprive the plaintiff of any recovery.19
Although the rule barring interrogatories calling for opinions, con-
tentions, and conclusions was followed by many courts, there was, from
the first, a competing line of thought. As early as 1939 it was recog-
14. Ryan v. LeHigh Valley R.R., 5 F.R.D. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). It is interesting
to note that no court has ever said that statements of fact in answers to interrogatories
would be binding at trial, yet it is difficult to find a basis for distinction.
15. See Gridiron Steel Co. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 361 F.2d 791 (6th Cir.
1966) (held that answers by a party to interrogatories may be used for any purpose and
may constitute admissions against interest).
16. 445 F.2d 619 (6th Cir. 1971).
17. Id. at 621, quoting Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Stockton Stevedoring Co., 388 F.2d
955, 959 (9th Cir. 1968).
18. 139 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
19. Id.
1975]
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nized that the purpose of rule 33 interrogatories was to narrow the is-
sues in the case and thus to avoid unnecessary preparation for and testi-
mony at trial.2 0  Thus, in several patent infringement cases the courts
required parties to answer interrogatories calling for opinions, conten-
tions, and conclusions.2 1 Finally, in Taylor v. Sound Steamship Lines,
Inc.,22 a district court abandoned completely the rule that interrogator-
ies were objectionable solely on the ground that they called for
opinions, contentions, or conclusions. Instead, the court stated that the
real and only test should be whether the interrogatory in question
served any substantial purpose.2 3  Thereafter numerous courts24 adop-
ted the position that
"[i]f the answer might serve some ligitimate purpose, either in
leading to evidence or in narrowing the issues, and to require it
would not unduly burden or prejudice the interrogated party, the
court should require answer."
Any rule which attempts to make rigid distinctions between
matters of fact and conclusions of fact will prove unworkable, since
the differences between the two categories are ones of degree, not
kind.25
By the mid-1960's, the federal district courts had become hopelessly
divided on the question, some following the strict rule and others fol-
lowing the more progressive rule.20
IT. THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES RESPONDS
On March 1, 1970, rule 33 was amended as noted above.27  Not-
ing the conflicting decisions on the point, 8 the Advisory Committee
stated that:
Rule 33 is amended to provide that an interrogatory is not ob-
20. Schwartz v. Howard Hosiery Co., 27 F. Supp. 443 (E.D. Pa. 1939).
21. Armour Research Foundation v. Brush Dev. Co., 9 F.R.D. 113 (N.D. Ohio
1949); Mclnerney v. Wm. P. McDonald Constr. Co., 28 F. Supp. 557 (E.D.N.Y. 1939);
Pierce v. Submarine Signal Co., 25 F. Supp. 862 (D. Mass. 1939).
22. 100 F. Supp. 388 (D. Conn. 1951).
23. Id. at 389.
24. E.g., Leumi Financial Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 295 F. Supp.
539 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Carrier Mfg. Co. v. Rex Chainbelt, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 717 (E.D.
Wis. 1968); Microtron Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 269 F. Supp. 22 (D.N.J.
1967); Brunswick Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 43 F.R.D. 208 (E.D. Wis. 1967); Diversified
Prods. Corp. v. Sports Center Co., 42 F.R.D. 3 (D. Md. 1967).
25. Roberson v. Great Am. Ins. Cos., 48 F.R.D. 404, 413 (N.D. Ga. 1969), quot-
ing 4A MooRE I 33.17, at 33-85.
26. See Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 28 U.S.C. Rule 33 at 7792
(1970); 4A MooRE 33.17; 8 WRIGHT & MILLER § 2167.
27. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
28. Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 28 U.S.C. Rule 33 at 7792 (1970).
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jectionable merely because it calls for an opinion or contention that
relates to fact or the application of law to fact. Efforts to draw
sharp lines between facts and opinions have invariably been unsuc-
cessful, and the clear trend of the cases is to permit "factual" opin-
ions. As to requests for opinions or contentions that call for the
application of law to fact, they can be most useful in narrowing
and sharpening the issues, which is a major purpose of discovery.
.... The general rule governing the use of answers to in-
terrogatories is that under ordinary circumstances they do not
limit proof.20
The rule as it stood prior to amendment could have been interpreted
to achieve the results mandated by the amendment. 30  The amend-
ment, however, was necessary to authoritatively eliminate the restrictive
interpretation of rule 33 by some courts and thereby restore a proper
balance between the portions of the rules dealing with pleading and
those dealing with discovery. Under the federal rules, pleadings need
only give notice of the claims asserted.3 The rationale for this is that,
if a party desires further information about the matters in controversy,
he may obtain it through discovery.3" If discovery does not include the
use of interrogatories to ascertain opinions and contentions, the party
must resort to depositions which are expensive and will often prove un-
availing.33 Therefore, the allowance of interrogatories calling for
opinions and contentions of fact and law applied to fact is an essential
element of the notice pleading system.
I. THE CASES UNDER THE AMENDED RULE
Rule 33(b) now provides that an interrogatory "is not necessarily
29. Id.
30. As noted earlier, prior to the 1970 amendment the scope of interrogatories was
defined as any matter that could be inquired into under rule 26(b). Rule 26(b) required
only that a matter inquired into be relevant and calculated to lead to admissible evi-
dence, though not necessarily admissible itself as evidence. Clearly, nothing in that lan-
guage mandates the position that opinions, conclusions and contentions do not fall
within permissible discovery. Proposed 1967 Amendments to the Federal Discovery
Rules, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 271, 284 (1968).
31. 4A MooRE 133.17, at 33-86.
32. Id.
33. First, assuming a prohibition on discovering a party's contentions by interroga-
tories, the opposing party, except in the simplest negligence cases will not know precisely
what questions to ask when taking a deposition. Secondly, asking a party, during a
deposition, for his contentions and conclusions of law as related to fact will usually be
useless. In the vast majority of situations the deposed party would be unable to relate
the facts to relevant legal conclusions. Since a party's attorney cannot be deposed, in-
terrogatories are the only way to get this information; cf. Microtron Corp. v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., 269 F. Supp. 22, 25 (D.NJ. 1967).
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objectionable merely because an answer to the interrogatory involves
an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law
to fact." (emphasis added) This phrase clearly implies that, while
opinions, contentions, and conclusions of law as applied to fact usually
may be inquired into by interrogatory, there are some circumstances
in which they may not.
In view of the purposes of interrogatories to supplement notice
pleading 4 and to narrow and define the issues for trial 3 the best cri-
terion for evaluating an interrogatory relating to "opinion or contention
of fact or the application of law to fact," is whether it relates to an "es-
sential element ' 6 of either party's claim or defense. This hypothesis
will be tested by surveying the few cases decided since the amendment
of rule 33.
In Goodman v. IBM Corp.,3 7 a personal injury action, plaintiff
asked defendant, by interrogatory, "[w]hy did the material fall from or
above Defendant's property onto North Street on December 3, 1970?"
The defendant objected to the interrogatory on the ground that it in-
vaded the province of the jury in seeking the defendant's conclusion on a
material question of fact. 9 The court, citing rule 33 (b), held that the
interrogatory would be proper if amended to read "How, if you know,
did the material fall . ...
As formulated by both plaintiff and the court,41 the interrogatory
sought facts, or opinions and conclusions of fact concerning what caused
the material to fall from defendant's property. Since an essential el-
ement of any case involving personal injury caused by a falling object
is proof of some negligent act or omission causing the object to fall,
the interrogatory in question clearly was related to an "essential
element. '42
34. See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
35. See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
36. The term "essential element" is intended to refer to those things that must be
shown to make out a prima facie claim or defense.
37. 59 F.R.D. 278 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
38. Id. at 279.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. There seems to be no significant difference between the question as put by
plaintiff and as rephrased by the court. The court appears to be quibbling over seman-
tics. Clearly, all parties and the court knew what information was requested by the in-
terrogatory. Further, it would seem that the defendant would be privileged to answer
"I do not know," if applicable, whether or not the words "if you know" were in the
question.
42. Perhaps the information sought by the interrogatory would not be essential to
a claim based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. However, this was not such a claim,
700 [Vol. 53
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In Scovill Manufacturing Co. v. Sunbeam Corp.43 plaintiff sought
to have certain of defendant's patents declared void. Defendant coun-
terclaimed for patent infringement. Plaintiff addressed interrogatories
to defendant relating to defendant's interpretation of the latter's patents.
Defendant objected on the grounds that the interrogatories called for
speculative answers. The court ordered the interrogatories answered,
finding that, even though the answer would include opinions, in this
case they would serve the substantial purpose of refining the issues for
trial and limiting the necessary proof. 44 As in Goodman, these interro-
gatories qualify under the "essential element" analysis. The interpret-
ation of the patent in question is clearly an essential element of either
a claim of the invalidity of the patent or a claim for its infringement.
Spector Freight Systems, Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co.'"5 is a case
in which an interrogatory requesting an opinion or conclusion of law
as applied to fact was held to be improper. Plaintiff sued defendant
on a surety bond. Defendant submitted interrogatories to plaintiff ask-
ing him to state generally the nature of testimony that certain persons
having knowledge of relevant facts were competent to give. The court
denied defendant's motion to compel answers. It held that
[t]he competency of a witness to give testimony is strictly a ques-
tion of evidence for the court to rule on at trial. A party is not
permitted to obtain through discovery a pure conclusion of evidence
law or an opinion which calls for a degree of expertise which the
other party is not expected to possess. . . . Requiring answers to
these interrogatories will not result in a narrowing of the issues pre-
sented, nor will it accomplish any other legitimate purpose. 40
The court apparently treated the challenged interrogatory as one calling
for a purely legal conclusion, which even amended rule 33 does not
allow. 47 However, the interrogatory did not call for a purely legal con-
clusion, but rather for a conclusion of law as related to fact. Deciding
whether a particular witness is competent to testify to particular facts
involves the application of evidentiary law to facts concerning the wit-
ness. That is no more solely a question of law than an interrogatory
asking a party whether he had ever been an assignee of certain promis-
and in any event, a res ipsa claim is essentially a negligence claim such that the facts
sought by the question are arguably related to an "essential element."
43. 357 F. Supp. 943 (D. Del. 1973).
44. Id. at 948.
45. 58 F.R.D. 162 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
46. Id. at 164.
47. Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 59 F.R.D. 500, 503 (N.D. Ill.
1973); Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 28 U.S.C. Rule 33, at 7791 (1970).
1975] 701
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sory notes .4  This does not mean, however, that the case was
improperly decided. It appears that the trial judge reached the proper
result, but not entirely for the proper reasons. The interrogatory in
Spector was improper, not because it called for a conclusion of law, but
rather because it called for a conclusion of law as applied to fact which
did not relate to an "essential element" of either a claim or defense
in the case. Clearly, the question of whether a particular witness is
comoetent to give particular evidence does not aid in the establishment
of a prima facie claim or defense. Therefore this case is consistent
with the suggested "essential element" test.
In Union Carbide Corp. v. Travelers Indemnity Co.4 9 each of two
defendant insurance companies provided products liability insurance to
plaintiff. The determinative issue in the case was which insurance
company provided the coverage of the risk in question. Defendant
Travelers posed interrogatories to defendant Aetna asking what re-
serves Aetna carried on the liability asserted by plaintiff and what re-
serves it carried on product risk claims against plaintiff during a rele-
vant period. 0 Upon objection to the interrogatories, the trial court
ruled them improper, holding that, while the 1970 amendments rend-
ered opinions discoverable, "the intent of the Rules is directed to
opinions as to factual issues in controversy and do not render discover-
able the internal opinions and conclusions of Aetna. .... GI
The amount of reserves carried on its policy, while probably in-
dicating Aetna's opinion on the risks covered by the policy, was not an
essential element of either company's claimed construction of its policy.
Therefore, the interrogatory did not qualify under the "essential
element" test. In fact, when the court stated that "the intent of the
Rule is directed to opinions as to factual issues in controversy" it was,
in effect, stating the "essential element" test.
In Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp.5 2 plaintiff al-
leged violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Count I of the
complaint alleged that the defendant monopolized and attempted to
48. Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
The question here clearly involves the application of the law of assignment of contract
rights to the particular facts of the case.
49. 61 F.R.D. 411 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
50. Id. at 413. Other interrogatories before the court requested facts concerning
defenses raised by the answering defendants. Since those interrogatories so clearly
qualify under the suggested "essential element" analysis, they are not discussed here.
51. Id.
52. 59 F.R.D. 500 (N.D. I11. 1973).
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monopolize trade and commerce in six markets; Count H alleged that
the defendant had entered exclusive dealing and tying arrangements
with certain distributors; and Count MI alleged that the defendant fixed
resale prices and imposed customer and territorial restrictions on dis-
tributors. Defendant's interrogatories sought the factual basis for plain-
tiffs allegations concerning the defendant's market power and dom-
inance and concerning the alleged injury to the plaintiff resulting from
the alleged antitrust violations. The court allowed the interrogatories
holding that "[a]n interrogatory which inquires into the facts upon
which certain vague and general allegations of a complaint are founded
. . . is not objectionable on the ground that it calls for a legal conclu-
sion."' ' 3
Once again it is obvious that all of the interrogatories submitted
by the defendant and allowed by the court relate to essential elements
of the plaintiff's claim. Proof of market power and dominance is an
essential element of a monopolization claim, and proof of injury is nec-
essary for a recovery of damages under any of the theories alleged.
Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc.5 4 involved a class action un-
der the Truth in Lending Act.55 Some of the plaintiff's interrogatories
asked whether the defendant had ever been the assignee of certain
promissory notes which allegedly violated the Truth in Lending Act.
The court ruled that, although the interrogatories required conclusions
of law as applied to fact, they were proper under rule 33(b).50 Again,
the information sought by the contested interrogatories was related to
an essential element of plaintiff's claim because to recover he needed
to establish a connection between defendant and the allegedly illegal
promissory notes.
The only case decided since rule 33 was amended that cannot
clearly be analyzed with the "essential element" test is Philadelphia Re-
sistance v. Mitchell.5 7  There plaintiffs were suing then-Attorney Gen-
eral John Mitchell and others for illegal wiretapping and surveillance.
Some of plaintiffs' interrogatories were disallowed by the court because
of governmental privilege, 58 but others, not relevant to the discussion
53. Id. at 502.
54. 336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681 (1970).
56. 336 F. Supp. at 319.
57. 58 F.R.D. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
58. Id. at 142. Privilege as related to interrogatories is beyond the scope of this
comment.
19751
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here, were allowed.5 9 The troublesome interrogatories were those re-
lating to a document stolen from an office of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in Media, Pennsylvania and possessed by plaintiffs.60 The
document was a memorandum of a conference of government officials.
In it, the conclusions of the conference were stated to be that federal
investigative agencies should follow a policy of "enhancing the paranoia
of the New Left,"'" and that there should be an attempt to convince
the "New Left" that there was an F.B.I. agent "behind every mail-
box. '62  Plaintiffs sent interrogatories seeking the following informa-
tion: who attended the conference, what was its purpose, and who
authorized it; under what legal authority was the document written and
distributed; what was the government's purpose in "enhancing the
paranoia of the New Left"; what steps had been taken to "enhance
the paranoia"; which of the plaintiffs were considered in that section
of the population denominated "New Left"; and which plaintiffs had
been the subject of the policy of "enhancing the paranoia of the New
Left" and under what circumstances and when and where had the de-
fendants or their agents implemented or attempted to implement this
policy with respect to any plaintiff.63 Nothing on the face of the docu-
ment referred to any plaintiff.
Upon the government's motion the court struck all of the interro-
gatories ruling that "they request legal conclusions and interpretation
of [the document], questions beyond the scope of discovery."04  The
court's stated reasons for its ruling are so broad and conclusory as to
make any analysis difficult. However, at least as to some of the in-
terrogatories the ruling clearly seems erroneous.
The questions concerning who attended the conference, its pur-
pose, the authority under which the document was written and distri-
buted, and the government's purpose in "enhancing the paranoia of the
New Left," are probably objectionable, not because they call for legal
conclusions or documentary interpretation, but because they are not
"relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action."6 How-
59. Id. at 144-45.
60. Id. at 147-48.
61. Id. at 147.
62. Id. at 148.
63. Id. at 147-48.
64. Id. at 148.
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1). Except to the extent that an answer to the question
might reveal that one of the defendants attended the conference, it is not obvious that
any of these questions would be relevant to a claim of excessive and illegal surveillance.
[Vol. 53
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ever the same objection cannot be made to the questions relating to
which plaintiffs had been the subject of the policy of "enhancing the
paranoia of the New Left" and when, where and under what circum-
stances the defendants or their agents implemented that policy with re-
gard to any plaintiff. All of the information sought by these questions
would be relevant to the action, and the questions seem to be directed
toward eliciting admissible evidence. Further, the questions clearly do
not seek conclusions of law. The only conclusion apparently sought
by the interrogatories is whether or not the policy of "enhancing the
paranoia" was implemented against any plaintiff. Clearly, these ques-
tions qualify under the "essential element" test. Proof of surveillance
under this or any policy is an essential element of a claim of illegal
surveillance. Therefore, as to these interrogatories, Philadelphia Re-
sistance was wrongly decided and should not impugn the validity of the
suggested "essential element" test.66
IV CONCLUSION
The 1970 amendment to rule 33 was intended to resolve the con-
flict on the question of the permissibility of interrogatories dealing with
opinions and contentions of fact or law as applied to fact. The cases
under the new rule seem to indicate that the desired result has been
achieved. Courts no longer have to waste time pondering the difficult
question of what is fact and what is opinion nor must they attempt to
decide what is a question of law as applied to fact and what is a ques-
tion of pure law. No longer are interrogatories automatically dis-
allowed by courts upon the finding that they call for an opinion or con-
tention. The amendment, however, by stating that such interrogatories
are not necessarily improper, recognizes that there are other considera-
tions. Thus courts allow such interrogatories only where they will serve
some substantial purpose. The cases decided under the amendment
suggest that a good test of whether an interrogatory calling for an
opinion or contention of fact or the application of law to fact serves
some substantial purpose, is whether the interrogatory relates to an "es-
sential element" of a claim or defense. 7 The net result of the amend-
Further, they do not seem to be calculated to lead to admissible evidence as required
by rule 26(b) (1).
66. The writer does not believe that this case should be cited as precedent for strik-
ing certain types of interrogatories in ordinary civil actions because there were special
considerations concerning stolen government documents, governmental privilege, and
national security claims involved.
67. An interrogatory that relates to an "essential element" should always be per-
1975] 705
